Security & IT News

CVSSv3 Score: 6.9 An Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints [CWE-923] vulnerability in FortiSIEM Windows Agent may allow an unauthorized attacker on the same local network to execute arbitrary code via spoofing the supervisors hostname when the Windows device is configured with the 'Supers Override' feature. Revised on 2026-07-14 00:00:00

Attackers whose methods line up with the data-extortion group ShinyHunters have spent the past year walking into corporate Salesforce environments without exploiting a single flaw in the platform. The way in has been the trust the organization had already extended, usually through the OAuth connections that tie Salesforce to the apps and third-party vendors around it. In

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Japan's largest taxi operator, Nihon Kotsu, announced that its systems were compromised in a cyberattack, forcing the company to shut down part of its infrastructure. [...]

Apple would not comment on the "security breach," which allegedly allowed a former employee to download sensitive files from Apple's network long after he departed the company for rival OpenAI.

Google and Microsoft have pulled ModHeader, a popular header-editing extension with roughly 1.6 million installs across Chrome and Edge, after researchers found a hidden browsing-history collector built into its official store version. The collector was dormant. An empty allow-list kept it switched off, and no proof has emerged that it ever gathered or sent a single browsing domain. The

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is warning that attackers are exploiting vulnerabilities in the iCagenda and Balbooa Forms extensions for Joomla to achieve remote code execution through arbitrary file uploads. [...]

Give an AI assistant a memory and access to your inbox, and you hand an attacker a way to rewrite what it thinks it knows about you. A single email can trick that agent into saving a false "fact" about the user, hide the change, and quietly steer its answers in later sessions. When it works, the person reads an ordinary-looking reply and never learns their assistant was tampered with. The

UK authorities charged five people following a National Crime Agency (NCA) investigation into Russian Coms, a major caller ID spoofing platform used by criminals to make over 1.8 million scam calls. [...]

A new phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operation called Forg365 is using a combination of device code phishing, adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) tactics, antibot evasion, artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted lure creation, and post-compromise mailbox operations targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Distributed via Telegram and costing $400 a month (or $3,800 per year), attack chains leverage phishing

p CISA has added one new vulnerability to its a href="https://edit.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog" Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog /a , based on evidence of active exploitation. /p ul type="square" li a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4128" target="_blank" CVE-2008-4128 /a Cisco IOS Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability /li /ul p This type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise. /p p a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk" Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk /a establishes vulnerability management requirements for Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies. BOD 26-04 reinforces the importance of the KEV Catalog and requires federal agencies to prioritize rapid remediation of high-risk vulnerabilities, specifically those identified by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) listed in CISA’s KEV Catalog on publicly exposed assets that grant total control of the asset post-exploitation, while deferring action for lower-risk vulnerabilities. BOD 26-04 further establishes basic expectations for when agencies must check whether threat actors compromised the system before the patch was applied. /p p While BOD 26-04 applies only to FCEB agencies, CISA encourages all organizations to adopt risk-based vulnerability management and prioritize remediation of a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog" KEV Catalog vulnerabilities /a . CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog/reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities" specified criteria /a . /p p Aware of an exploited vulnerability not currently listed in the KEV Catalog? Submit it for potential addition through CISA’s a class="ext" href="https://cisasurvey.gov1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1Zwu52kgK2OYf3w" target="_blank" KEV Nomination Form /a . Potential KEV additions must have a CVE ID, evidence of exploitation, and clear mitigation guidance. nbsp; /p

p Russian Government-Sponsored Activity Targets Poorly Configured and Vulnerable Devices Across Critical Sectors /p h2 strong Executive summary /strong /h2 p Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors continue to exploit poorly configured and vulnerable networking devices worldwide, opportunistically compromising multiple critical infrastructure sector networks. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) builds on FBI’s a href="https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2025/PSA250820" target="_blank" Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure /a Public Service Announcement of the decade-plus FSB Center 16 cyber activity by providing additional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to enable defenders to more fully understand and counter the threat. [ a href="#Work1" 1 /a ] nbsp; /p p This CSA is being released by the following authoring and co-sealing agencies: nbsp; /p ul type="square" li United States National Security Agency (NSA) /li li United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) /li li United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) /li li United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) /li li Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC) /li li Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) /li li New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) /li li United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK) /li li Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) a href="#Foot1" sup 1 /sup /a nbsp; /li li Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) a href="#Foot2" sup 2 nbsp; /sup /a /li li Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) a href="#Foot3" sup 3 /sup /a nbsp; /li li Estonian Information System Authority (RIA) a href="#Foot4" sup 4 /sup /a /li li Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI) a href="#Foot5" sup 5 /sup /a /li li Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) a href="#Foot6" sup 6 /sup /a /li li French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) a href="#Foot7" sup 7 /sup /a /li li Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE) a href="#Foot8" sup 8 nbsp; /sup /a /li li Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI) a href="#Foot9" sup 9 /sup /a /li li The Military Counterintelligence Service of Poland (SKW) a href="#Foot10" sup 10 nbsp; /sup /a /li li Sweden National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-SE) a href="#Foot11" sup 11 nbsp; /sup /a /li /ul p The authoring and co-sealing agencies strongly urge device owners and network defenders to take mitigation and remediation actions against Russian government-sponsored exploitation of vulnerable routers. /p figure class="c-figure c-figure--image" role="group" div class="c-figure__media" img loading="lazy" src="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/styles/large/public/2026-07/Figure%201%20FSB%20Center%2016%20activity%20and%20recommended%20mitigation%20actions.png?itok

Meta has filed a patent application for an AI that listens to your voice throughout the day, works out how it thinks you are feeling from the way you sound, and keeps a timestamped log of every read. Each read gets pinned to the moment it happened: the time, your location, what you were doing, even how you were using your phone. Some versions in the filing would listen all day; others would

A few days ago, I was sitting with the CISO of a Fortune 50 company, walking through how his security team was thinking about AI agents in the SOC. Smart team. Serious program. They had already connected Claude to a few detection tools and were seeing real value in specific investigations. But as we mapped out the broader architecture, something kept nagging at me. The design they were building

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged an intrusion in which an unknown threat actor leveraged a vibe-coded PowerShell script for Active Directory (AD) enumeration. "The script looked for the Domain Controller (DC) and mapped users, computers, and domains, before creating a directory and exporting out a number of files, and finally creating AD_Report.html to measure the success of the

Cybersecurity agencies from the United States and eight other countries have issued a joint warning that Russian state hackers are targeting vulnerable and poorly configured routers to infiltrate critical infrastructure networks. [...]

Australian Cyber Security Centre warns CMS users of mass scanning and exploitation campaign

An attacker running a live Microsoft 365 phishing operation left a Python web server listening on a public port with directory listing switched on. The command that did it: python3 -m http.server 8080, was still sitting in the readable .bash_history. From that one lapse, French security firm Lexfo lifted the operator's entire toolkit and pivoted through it to two more

The setup I pulled 14 days of Apache and ModSecurity logs from a single small web host. Nothing special about it. A handful of low-traffic virtual hosts. A WordPress site, a couple of custom application backends, a static devotional site. The kind of server that exists by the millions and that nobody would call a high-value target. Server IP and hostnames are anonymized throughout this diary. The point of looking was not to find a breach. It was to see what the background radiation of internet scanning looks like in 2026. Most of it is exactly what you would expect. WordPress xmlrpc floods. Endless .env probing. Git config fishing. But mixed into the noise was a category of scanning I had not seen documented before. Someone is systematically looking for Model Context Protocol servers, AI assistant configuration files, and locally exposed LLM endpoints. On a server that runs none of those things. The overall picture Figure 1 breaks down the reconnaissance categories that ModSecurity flagged over the two-week window. I split them into two groups. The classic cloud and application recon that every server sees, and the newer AI-agent recon that is the subject of this diary. ??????? Spring Boot Actuator scanning dominates by request volume. That is not new. The full set of actuator endpoints including /actuator/heapdump and /actuator/env gets hit hundreds of times from dozens of sources. The interesting part is the group below it. MCP handshakes, LLM API probes, AI assistant secret fishing, and MCP config files together account for roughly 200 requests. And the MCP protocol handshake category came from 49 distinct source IPs, more spread than any other category in the dataset. This is not one researcher. It is a broad, distributed scan. The Part That Stood Out: A Real MCP Handshake Most scanning is dumb. A bot requests a path, checks the status code, moves on. The POST /mcp probes were different. Every one of them carried a valid JSON-RPC 2.0 body performing a Model Context Protocol initialize call. POST /mcp HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/json { id :1, jsonrpc : 2.0 , method : initialize , params :{ capabilities :{}, clientInfo :{ name : client , version : 0 }, protocolVersion : 2025-03-26 }} This matters. The scanner is not blindly requesting a URL. It is speaking the protocol. It sends a correctly formed handshake with a real MCP protocol version and waits to see if something on the other end answers like an MCP server. If your server responds to that initialize call then the next steps are to enumerate the tools the server exposes, the data sources it connects to, and whatever it can be convinced to do. Figure 2 shows the flow. For readers who have not deployed one yet: an MCP server is the bridge that lets an AI agent call tools and read data sources. It is the thing that gives a model access to your database, your file system, your ticketing system, your internal APIs. An exposed and unauthenticated MCP server is close to the worst case. It

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