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In this article Attack chain overview Threat actor attribution Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of Compromise (IOC) References Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence has uncovered an active supply chain attack involving malicious npm packages registered under organizational scopes that mirror real internal corporate namespaces, employing dependency confusion technique to deploy an obfuscated reconnaissance payload. On May 28 and May 29, 2026, a threat actor operating under three maintainer aliases mr.4nd3r50n ( mr.4nd3r50n@yandex[.]ru ), ce-rwb ( ogvanta@yandex[.]ru ), and t-in-one ( t-in-one@yandex[.]ru ) published malicious packages across two publishing bursts. The packages impersonate internal corporate packages across nine different organizational scopes using a dependency confusion technique, and several spoof internal enterprise infrastructure URLs (GitHub Enterprise, Jira, documentation portals) in their package.json to appear legitimate. Once installed, the packages download and execute an obfuscated reconnaissance payload from an attacker-controlled command-and-control (C2) server. All packages in the cluster ship the same heavily obfuscated postinstall stager and connect to the same C2 endpoint, a ~17 KB JavaScript dropper used for for environment fingerprinting and credential reconnaissance. The payload runs silently during npm install and operates in “reconnaissance-only” mode, collecting system information, hostnames, environment variables, and developer context. The architecture includes a RECON_ONLY flag that can be toggled server-side for full exploitation in follow-on attacks. Based on our investigation and feedback to the npm team these repos and users were taken down. Key capabilities observed in the campaign include automatic execution through npm lifecycle hooks, obfuscator.io-style anti-analysis techniques, platform-specific payload delivery (Windows, macOS, Linux), continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) environment detection and bypass, cache-based deduplication to evade repeated-execution monitoring, and a two-phase attack design (reconnaissance now, exploitation later). Attack chain overview The campaign spans dozens of scoped packages published under three npm maintainer accounts that our forensic analysis attributes to a single operator (detailed in the Attribution section below). The attack proceeds through: Publication of dependency confusion packages under three actor identities across nine organizational scopes Automatic payload execution through a postinstall hook during npm install Execution chain: npm install → postinstall → scripts/postinstall.js (obfuscated) → HTTPS GET to C2 → write payload to tmpdir → spawn detached process Environment reconnaissance with credentials and context exfiltration using environment variables passed to the spawned payload Figure 1. Dependency confusion attack flow. The lure: Dependency confusion and spoofed internal metadata The actor adop

Someone named “Squid” seems to be a “ West Country legend .” As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.

More Linux LPEs Hark the age of the Linux LPE has arrived. This week’s release follows up on recent work bringing new Linux LPEs to Metasploit users. Copy Fail seemed to have kicked off a trend of similar bugs and hot on its heels is Dirty Frag. Dirty Frag is actually two vulnerabilities in a trenchcoat, individually identified as CVE-2026-43284 and CVE-2026-43500. Each is exploitable individually and comes with a new Metasploit module. New module content (5) Citrix ADC (NetScaler) CVE-2026-3055 Scanner Authors: sfewer-r7 and watchTowr Type: Auxiliary Pull request: #21204 contributed by sfewer-r7 Path: scanner/http/citrix_netscaler_cve_2026_3055 AttackerKB reference: CVE-2026-3055 Description: Adds auxiliary module targeting CVE-2026-3055, an info leak in Citrix NetScaler (when configured as an SAML IdP). Similar to the other CitrixBleed vulns, we can leak memory and potentially discover session cookies. Ollama Scanner Author: h00die Type: Auxiliary Pull request: #21271 contributed by h00die Path: scanner/http/ollama_info Description: Adds an ollama LLM auxiliary scanner module to enumerate which LLMs are installed and details about them. xfrm-ESP Page-Cache Write via CVE-2026-43284 Authors: Giovanni Heward and Hyunwoo Kim Type: Exploit Pull request: #21434 contributed by offsecguy Path: linux/local/cve_2026_43284_dirty_frag AttackerKB reference: CVE-2026-43284 Description: Adds two new local privilege escalation modules for the "DirtyFrag" Linux kernel vulnerabilities. The first targets CVE-2026-43284, a page-cache write vulnerability in the xfrm/ESP fragmentation path. The second targets CVE-2026-43500, a page-cache corruption vulnerability in the RxRPC/rxkad subsystem. Dompdf RCE via Malicious Font Caching (CVE-2022-28368) Authors: Adithya Pawar, Fabian Bräunlein, Maximilian Kirchmeier, msutovsky-r7, and rvizx Type: Exploit Pull request: #21155 contributed by Adithyadspawar Path: multi/http/dompdf_rce_cve_2022_28368 AttackerKB reference: CVE-2022-28368 Description: Adds a new exploit module for CVE-2022-28368, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in dompdf prior to 1.2.1. When remote resource loading is enabled, dompdf preserves the .php extension when caching fonts fetched via CSS @font-face rules, allowing an attacker to drop a PHP webshell in the font cache directory and trigger it with a follow-up request. Supsystic Contact Form Wordpress Plugin SSTI RCE Authors: Azril Fathoni and bootstrapbool [email protected] Type: Exploit Pull request: #21267 contributed by bootstrapbool Path: multi/http/wp_plugin_supsystic_contact_form_rce AttackerKB reference: CVE-2026-4257 Description: This adds a module to exploit CVE-2026-4257 resulting in remote code execution on Wordpress sites with the Contact Form by Supsystic plugin. Contact Form plugin versions 1.7.36 and before are vulnerable. Bugs fixed (4) #21390 from zeroSteiner - This refines our smb_to_ldap relay attack reporting by demoting anonymous authentication messages fro

Threat actors are abusing ChatGPT's content-sharing feature to display fake OpenAI outage pages that direct users to download malware disguised as the ChatGPT desktop application. [...]

California Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a lawsuit against 23andMe, now Chrome Holding Co., over the company's failure to protect sensitive customer genetic and personal information. [...]

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a vulnerability in OpenAI ChatGPT that leverages the artificial intelligence (AI) assistant's implicit trust in Markdown links and images to trigger prompt injections and open the door to phishing attacks. The technique has been codenamed ChatGPhish by Permiso Security. "The chatgpt.com response renderer trusts Markdown links and Markdown

A public spat between Microsoft and an independent security researcher reopens a long-running debate over who is responsible for securing software.

Overview On May 13, 2026, Palo Alto Networks published a security advisory for CVE-2026-0257, a medium severity authentication bypass affecting PAN-OS and Prisma Access when a specific configuration is present. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to successfully establish a VPN connection through the GlobalProtect gateway of an affected appliance. Rapid7 MDR identified successful exploitation across numerous customers, however we did not observe any indication of successful lateral movement from the devices. The earliest date for observed exploitation was May 17, 2026. As of May 29, 2026, this vulnerability has been added to the CISA KEV. While the assigned CVSSv4 score indicates a medium severity, due to the circumstances surrounding this vulnerability Rapid7 urges that organizations treat this as a critical vulnerability. An authentication bypass in an edge facing enterprise VPN appliance can have significant impact to affected organizations. As such, organizations running affected appliances are urged to upgrade to a vendor supplied patch on an urgent basis. Observed Attacker Behavior On 2026-05-18 01:51:37 UTC, Rapid7 MDR responded to a 'Suspicious VPN Authentication - Local Account Logon via Generic Non-Human Identity' alert. During the initial investigation, Rapid7 observed a suspicious cookie authentication to the local admin account across multiple customer environments from the same hosting provider, Vultr. 14 May 18 01:51:37 palovpn-01 1,2026/05/18 01:51:37,010101010101,GLOBALPROTECT,0,2817,2026/05/18 01:51:37,vsys1,gateway-auth,login,Cookie,,admin,US,GP-CLIENT,104.207.144.154,0.0.0,0.0.0.0,0.0.0.0,aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff,,6.0.0,,Linux,"linux-64",1,,,"Auth latency: 78ms, profile: local_auth_profile",success,,0,,0,GP-Gateway,0101010101010101010,0x0,2026-05-18T01:51:37.264-05:00,,,,,,0,0,0,0,,palovpn-01,1,", GlobalProtect Authentication Log Rapid7 MDR analyzed the Palo Alto tech support files across the impacted customers and observed that Cloud Authentication Service (CAS) was disabled and the GlobalProtect portal or gateway had authentication override cookies enabled. Based on these findings, MDR analysts concluded that this was likely exploitation of CVE-2026-0257. Subsequent analysis by Rapid7 Labs confirmed this was accurate by validating a successful proof-of-concept. Rapid7 MDR observed a second wave of exploitation on May 21st. Due to the consistent MAC address, Rapid7 believes both waves of exploitation are likely from the same threat actor (TA). However, the second wave of compromises originated from the hosting provider, Dromatics Systems. In this wave of exploitation, Rapid7 observed VPN IP assignment following the cookie authentication, granting them access to the internal network. At this time, Rapid7 is unable to confirm why VPN assignment occurred only for a subset of exploited customers. Across multiple customers, Rapid7 observed successful exploitation via authentication probe

As threats become more coordinated and faster to execute, endpoint protection has become the proving ground for modern defense. For the seventh consecutive time, Microsoft has been named a Leader in the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Endpoint Protection . We believe this reflects both the strength of our technology, and the trust customers place in Microsoft Defender. Microsoft Defender delivers industry-leading Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), powered by global threat intelligence and built for the scale and speed of today’s attacks. For many of our customers, Defender’s endpoint capabilities are the foundation for a coordinated system of defense that spans endpoints, identities, email, apps, cloud, and data. Bringing these signals together changes what’s possible. It enables earlier detection, stronger prevention, and capabilities like predictive shielding that help stop attacks before they spread. This is the shift underway in security: from isolated tools to a connected system that can see across the environment, understand what’s changing, and take action in real time. It’s what makes the next generation of AI-driven, agentic security possible and helps defenders stay ahead of threats, not just respond to them. Get started with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Sustained innovation to stay ahead of changing threats Over the past year, Microsoft has introduced key advancements to endpoint protection that have empowered defenders to stay ahead of evolving cyberthreats, including: Proactive defense during attacks: Attack disruption now expands autonomous protection to predicting and blocking an adversary’s next move during active attacks . It acts just in time to harden against some of the most common attacker tactics, such as group policy objects (GPOs), Safeboot, and identity compromise, to stop lateral movement and defend dynamically. Custom telemetry: With new custom data collection capabilities , Defender makes it easy for security teams to collect specialized data directly within the Defender portal. It allows organizations to extend their endpoint telemetry beyond the 200+ default signals to support tailored detections and advanced hunting scenarios, such as AMSI for hunting over script content and Kerberos for auth-based and network attacks. Simplified onboarding: To help security teams onboard simply and securely, we’ve built new Defender deployment tools for Windows and Linux, which handle the entire process for you. Just download a single package and it will dynamically adapt to the operating system, take care of prerequisites, and install the latest version of Defender available as needed for older devices that don’t have it already built in. The Defender deployment tools eliminate friction, automate tricky steps, and provide predictability throughout the onboarding journey. Sovereign-ready protection: Defender enables customers to meet data storage and privacy needs while operating under public, sovereign, hybrid, or disconn

An unknown threat actor has been observed using a large language model (LLM) agent to conduct post-compromise actions after obtaining initial access following the exploitation of a publicly-accessible Marimo network using a recently disclosed vulnerability. "The attacker compromised an internet-reachable Marimo notebook via CVE-2026-39987, extracted two cloud credentials from the compromised

DDoS attacks are increasingly being sold like subscription services, complete with pricing tiers, support, and reseller programs. Flare explores how the DDoS-as-a-Service market has evolved from scattered tools into polished attack platforms. [...]

Dutch authorities have taken offline a massive botnet of 17 million devices and seized more than 200 servers at a local provider that supported the operation. [...]

You now have until tonight at 11:59 p.m. PT to lock in Early Bird savings of up to $410 for TechCrunch Disrupt 2026 before prices increase. Join 10,000+ tech leaders in October for one of the most anticipated tech events of the year. Register now.

Threat actors from the Silent Ransom Group, aka Luna Moth, are escalating attacks by impersonating IT staff in phone calls and even showing up in person to gain direct access to victim systems

Google says the Chrome Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) security feature is now generally available and is rolling out to all users to prevent account takeovers. [...]

p CISA has added one new vulnerability to its a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="79453b83-86b9-4e2f-b1ec-abf73c6eb291" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog" Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog /a , based on evidence of active exploitation. /p ul li a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-0257" target="_blank" CVE-2026-0257 /a Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS Authentication Bypass Vulnerability /li /ul p This type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise. /p p a href="https://www.cisa.gov/binding-operational-directive-22-01" Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities /a established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Reducing_the_Significant_Risk_of_Known_Exploited_Vulnerabilities_211103.pdf" BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet /a for more information. /p p Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="79453b83-86b9-4e2f-b1ec-abf73c6eb291" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog" KEV Catalog vulnerabilities /a as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities" specified criteria /a . nbsp; /p

A previously undocumented threat actor dubbed GREYVIBE has been attributed to ongoing and persistent attacks targeting Ukraine and Ukraine-related entities since at least August 2025. GREYVIBE, per WithSecure, is assessed to be a Russian-speaking group operating broadly in the Russian time zone, with the activities aligning with Kremlin state interests, specifically when it comes to

A North Carolina man was sentenced to more than 10 years in prison for selling the personal information of over 7 million elderly Americans to Jamaican scammers. [...]

Younger Americans have soured on the second Donald Trump presidency , but they are not protesting it. Despite an unpopular Iran war and an even more unpopular Trump administration , college campus protests nationwide have gone silent . And at many schools, student activism is virtually nonexistent . This silence comes in the wake of a relentless Trump administration war on campus speech that has involved lawsuits , arrests , deportations and expulsions . Reports cite a range of complicated factors for the restraint, from apathy to technology-induced incapacity. But as public policy and law and social science experts , we believe students aren’t protesting for a very simple reason: They are afraid. They are self-censoring and disengaging from campaign activism to avoid punitive measures. In law and social science, we call this impact a chilling effect —the behavioral tendency for people in face of a threat to self-censor and restrain their activities for self-protection. It’s increasingly clear to us that these impacts are not incidental or ancillary to Trump administration policy. Rather, the chilling effects are the point. This is the closest thing to a consistent governing strategy in Trump’s second term. The broader chill of Trump threats Chilling effects can be subtle, but today they are everywhere. And it’s not just students who are chilled by Trump administration threats. Professors are censoring themselves in lectures and rewriting syllabuses . Researchers are stripping grant applications of words that might attract federal scrutiny , or abandoning the topics entirely. Media outlets are modifying their news coverage to avoid Trump lawsuits or sanctions. Law enforcement and regulatory agencies are refusing to investigate Trump-aligned actors inside or outside government, and major national law firms are declining cases challenging Trump administration policies. Publishers are “ stepping back ” from LGBTQ+ books and other progressive subjects. Many in targeted immigrant communities are afraid to leave home to go to work or school . In most cases, these people and institutions are not being specifically targeted or threatened by Trump. But they are afraid, and their fear is doing the administration’s work for it. They stay silent, avoid attention and confrontation, and look the other way. In other cases, they change their speech and behavior to accommodate or conform to the administration’s worldview. Of course, there are counterexamples, such as the winter protests in Minneapolis in response to brutality by agents with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the recent “ No Kings ” rallies. But even here, the broader but less visible trend—chilling effects—is evident. For instance, in recent reporting on the latest No Kings rallies, many media outlets observed that students were noticeably missing , despite the Trump administration’s unpopularity among

Shadow AI used to mean employees pasting things they shouldn't into ChatGPT. It now means something bigger: employees building full applications with AI, wiring them into production systems, and publishing them on the open internet. Without Security or IT in the loop. The artifact moved from a prompt to a product. The risk surface moved with it. In The Shadow Builders report (get it here), a