Security & IT News

Iranian-linked hackers are targeting Internet-exposed Rockwell/Allen-Bradley programmable logic controllers (PLCs) on the networks of U.S. critical infrastructure organizations. [...]

The new model will be used by a small number of high-profile companies to engage in defensive cybersecurity work.

REF1695 hackers spread Monero mining malware via fake non-profit installers, using stealth tactics to evade detection and hijack systems for profit.

AI is rapidly changing how software is written, deployed, and used. Trends point to a future where AIs can write custom software quickly and easily: “instant software.” Taken to an extreme, it might become easier for a user to have an AI write an application on demand—a spreadsheet, for example—and delete it when you’re done using it than to buy one commercially. Future systems could include a mix: both traditional long-term software and ephemeral instant software that is constantly being written, deployed, modified, and deleted. AI is changing cybersecurity as well. In particular, AI systems are getting better at finding and patching vulnerabilities in code. This has implications for both attackers and defenders, depending on the ways this and related technologies improve. In this essay, I want to take an optimistic view of AI’s progress, and to speculate what AI-dominated cybersecurity in an age of instant software might look like. There are a number of unknowns that will factor into how the arms race between attacker and defender might play out. How flaw discovery might work On the attacker side, the ability of AIs to automatically find and exploit vulnerabilities has increased dramatically over the past few months. We are already seeing both government and criminal hackers using AI to attack systems. The exploitation part is critical here, because it gives an unsophisticated attacker capabilities far beyond their understanding. As AIs get better, expect more attackers to automate their attacks using AI. And as individuals and organizations can increasingly run powerful AI models locally, AI companies monitoring and disrupting malicious AI use will become increasingly irrelevant. Expect open-source software, including open-source libraries incorporated in proprietary software, to be the most targeted, because vulnerabilities are easier to find in source code. Unknown No. 1 is how well AI vulnerability discovery tools will work against closed-source commercial software packages. I believe they will soon be good enough to find vulnerabilities just by analyzing a copy of a shipped product, without access to the source code. If that’s true, commercial software will be vulnerable as well. Particularly vulnerable will be software in IoT devices: things like internet-connected cars, refrigerators, and security cameras. Also industrial IoT software in our internet-connected power grid, oil refineries and pipelines, chemical plants, and so on. IoT software tends to be of much lower quality, and industrial IoT software tends to be legacy. Instant software is differently vulnerable. It’s not mass market. It’s created for a particular person, organization, or network. The attacker generally won’t have access to any code to analyze, which makes it less likely to be exploited by external attackers. If it’s ephemeral, any vulnerabilities will have a short lifetime. But lots of instant software will live on networks for a long time. And if it gets

Hackers linked to Russia’s military intelligence units are using known flaws in older Internet routers to mass harvest authentication tokens from Microsoft Office users, security experts warned today. The spying campaign allowed state-backed Russian hackers to quietly siphon authentication tokens from users on more than 18,000 networks without deploying any malicious software or code. Microsoft said in a blog post today it identified more than 200 organizations and 5,000 consumer devices that were caught up in a stealthy but remarkably simple spying network built by a Russia-backed threat actor known as “ Forest Blizzard .” How targeted DNS requests were redirected at the router. Image: Black Lotus Labs. Also known as APT28 and Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard is attributed to the military intelligence units within Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). APT 28 famously compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. Researchers at Black Lotus Labs , a security division of the Internet backbone provider Lumen , found that at the peak of its activity in December 2025, Forest Blizzard’s surveillance dragnet ensnared more than 18,000 Internet routers that were mostly unsupported, end-of-life routers, or else far behind on security updates. A new report from Lumen says the hackers primarily targeted government agencies—including ministries of foreign affairs, law enforcement, and third-party email providers. Black Lotus Security Engineer Ryan English said the GRU hackers did not need to install malware on the targeted routers, which were mainly older Mikrotik and TP-Link devices marketed to the Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) market. Instead, they used known vulnerabilities to modify the Domain Name System (DNS) settings of the routers to include DNS servers controlled by the hackers. As the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) notes in a new advisory detailing how Russian cyber actors have been compromising routers, DNS is what allows individuals to reach websites by typing familiar addresses, instead of associated IP addresses. In a DNS hijacking attack, bad actors interfere with this process to covertly send users to malicious websites designed to steal login details or other sensitive information. English said the routers attacked by Forest Blizzard were reconfigured to use DNS servers that pointed to a handful of virtual private servers controlled by the attackers. Importantly, the attackers could then propagate their malicious DNS settings to all users on the local network, and from that point forward intercept any OAuth authentication tokens transmitted by those users. DNS hijacking through router compromise. Image: Microsoft. Because those tokens are typically transmitted only after the user has successfully logged in and gone through

Hackers are exploiting a maximum-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-59528, in the open-source platform Flowise for building custom LLM apps and agentic systems to execute arbitrary code. [...]

Fancy Bear, also known as APT28, has taken over thousands of residential home routers to steal passwords and authentication tokens in a wide-ranging espionage operation.

The Russia-linked threat actor known as APT28 (aka Forest Blizzard) has been linked to a new campaign that has compromised insecure MikroTik and TP-Link routers and modified their settings to turn them into malicious infrastructure under their control as part of a cyber espionage campaign since at least May 2025. The large-scale exploitation campaign has been codenamed

In the rapid evolution of the 2026 threat landscape, a frustrating paradox has emerged for CISOs and security leaders: Identity programs are maturing, yet the risk is actually increasing. According to new research from the Ponemon Institute, hundreds of applications within the typical enterprise remain disconnected from centralized identity systems. These "dark

GrafanaGhost is a critical vulnerability in Grafana’s AI components that uses indirect prompt injection and protocol-relative URL bypasses to exfiltrate data.

An international operation from law enforcement authorities in partnership with private companies has disrupted FrostArmada, an APT28 campaign hijacking local traffic from MikroTik and TP-Link routers to steal Microsoft account credentials. [...]

Newly identified malicious campaigns are linked to virtual private servers modified by APT28 to operate as malicious DNS servers

A high-severity security vulnerability has been disclosed in Docker Engine that could permit an attacker to bypass authorization plugins (AuthZ) under specific circumstances. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-34040 (CVSS score: 8.8), stems from an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-41110, a maximum-severity vulnerability in the same component that came to light in July 2024. "

GPUBreach uses GPU Rowhammer on GDDR6 to flip bits, corrupt page tables and escalate to system root

Automated pentesting tools deliver strong early results, then quickly plateau. Picus Security explains how the "PoC cliff" leaves major attack surfaces untested and creates a dangerous validation gap. [...]

In this article DNS hijacking attack chain: From compromised devices to AiTM and other follow-on activity Mitigation and protection guidance Microsoft Defender detection and hunting guidance Executive summary Forest Blizzard, a threat actor linked to the Russian military, has been compromising insecure home and small-office internet equipment like routers, then modifying their settings in ways that turn them into part of the actor’s malicious infrastructure. The threat actor then hides behind this legitimate but compromised infrastructure to spy on additional targets or conduct follow-on attacks. Microsoft Threat Intelligence is sharing information on this campaign to increase awareness of the risks associated with insecure home and small-office internet routing devices and give users and organizations tools to mitigate, detect, and hunt for these threats where they might be impacted. Since at least August 2025, the Russian military intelligence actor Forest Blizzard , and its sub-group tracked as Storm-2754, has conducted a large-scale exploitation of vulnerable small office/home office (SOHO) devices to hijack Domain Name System (DNS) requests and facilitate the collection of network traffic. For nation-state actors like Forest Blizzard, DNS hijacking enables persistent, passive visibility and reconnaissance at scale. By compromising edge devices that are upstream of larger targets, threat actors can take advantage of less closely monitored or managed assets to pivot into enterprise environments. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified over 200 organizations and 5,000 consumer devices impacted by Forest Blizzard’s malicious DNS infrastructure; telemetry did not indicate compromise of Microsoft-owned assets or services. Forest Blizzard, which primarily collects intelligence in support of Russian government foreign policy initiatives, has also leveraged its DNS hijacking activity to support post-compromise adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections against Microsoft Outlook on the web domains. This activity enables the interception of cloud-hosted content, impacting numerous sectors including government, information technology (IT), telecommunications, and energy—all usual targets for this actor. While the number of organizations specifically targeted for TLS AiTM is only a subset of the networks with vulnerable SOHO devices, Microsoft Threat Intelligence assesses that the threat actor’s broad access could enable larger-scale AiTM attacks, which might include active traffic interception. Targeting SOHO devices is not a new tactic, technique, or procedure (TTP) for Russian military intelligence actors, but this is the first time Microsoft has observed Forest Blizzard using DNS hijacking at scale to support AiTM of TLS connections after exploiting edge devices. In this blog, we share our analysis of the TTPs used by Forest Blizzard in this campaign to illustrate how threat actors leverage this at

GrafanaGhost chains AI prompt injection and URL flaws to exfiltrate sensitive Grafana data

The budget proposal would force CISA to operate with a significantly lower budget than previous years, citing the government's claims that the election misinformation programs were used to "target the President."

The agenda for the Rapid7 2026 Global Cybersecurity Summit is starting to take shape, and with it, a clearer picture of the conversations security teams need to be having right now. Taking place May 12–13, this year’s summit brings together a mix of security leaders, practitioners, analysts, and industry voices to explore how organizations are moving from reactive defense to preemptive security operations. The focus is practical. What is changing, what is not working, and what teams need to do differently. Voices from across the industry This year’s lineup reflects that shift. Alongside Rapid7 experts and customer speakers, the summit will feature well-known voices from across the security community. Rachel Tobac, CEO of SocialProof Security, joins the keynote panel The Reality of Running a SOC in 2026 , bringing a perspective grounded in how modern attacks actually begin and how attackers adapt in real time. She is joined by cybersecurity speaker and “Smashing Security” podcast host Graham Cluley, whose work has long focused on translating complex threats into practical understanding for security teams. From an analyst perspective, Craig Robinson of IDC and Dave Gruber of Omdia add an external view on how the market is evolving, where organizations are investing, and how security programs are being measured. Their contributions help ground the discussion in broader industry trends, not just individual experiences. Customer voices also play a central role. Leaders from organizations such as Netscout Systems, Target RWE, and Miltenyi Biotecwill share how they are navigating complexity, validating decisions around MDR and platform consolidation, and focusing on outcomes rather than activity. What to expect during the show Across two days, the summit is structured to reflect how security teams actually operate. Day one focuses on shared context with sessions like Defense Starts Earlier Than You Think and The Reality of Running a SOC in 2026 examining how the threat landscape has shifted and why traditional approaches are struggling to keep pace. From there, sessions such as Inside the Modern SOC and Using Red Teaming to Power Preemptive MDR move into how detection, response, and validation work in practice. The goal is to connect the full picture: how attacks begin, how they progress, and how teams respond when it matters. Day two is more focused on the unique needs of particular security roles. The two dedicated tracks allow attendees to go deeper into the implications of modern security evolution based on their daily realities. For security leaders, sessions such as The CISO’s Role in Enterprise Transformation and A CISO’s Guide to MDR Accountability and Outcomes explore governance, accountability, and ways to measure effectiveness that reflect real business risk. For practitioners, sessions like Hunt or Be Hunted and IR in Practice focus on the mechanics of investigation, detection and response. These sessions look closely at how analysts triage

An active campaign has been observed targeting internet-exposed instances running ComfyUI, a popular stable diffusion platform, to enlist them into a cryptocurrency mining and proxy botnet. "A purpose-built Python scanner continuously sweeps major cloud IP ranges for vulnerable targets, automatically installing malicious nodes via ComfyUI-Manager if no exploitable node is already